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Abstract—We propose a computationally efficient method
based on nonlinear optimization to identify critical lines, failure
of which can cause severe blackouts. Our method computes
criticality measure for all lines at a time, as opposed to detecting
a single vulnerability, providing a global view of the system. This
information on criticality of lines can be used to identify multiple
contingencies by selectively exploring multiple combinations of
broken lines. The effectiveness of our method is demonstrated
on the IEEE 30 and 118 bus systems, where we can very quickly
detect the most critical lines in the system and identify severe
multiple contingencies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Robust operation of a power network requires identifying
unplanned component outages that, if not adequately consid-
ered, could lead to costly blackouts. Planning and operating
criteria are designed so that “the interconnected power system
shall be operated at all times so that general system insta-
bility, uncontrolled separation, cascading outages, or voltage
collapse, will not occur as a result of any single contingency
or multiple contingencies of sufficiently high likelihood” [1].
While the “N − 1” criterion is achievableexpend in practice
for single contingencies, the “N − k” criteria for multiple
contingencies is hard to achieve even for small values of k
and moderate system sizes. Exploring multiple contingencies
requires new algorithms, since brute-force enumeration is very
resource demanding, and often prohibitively expensive. In
this work, we propose a mathematical model to measure the
criticality of lines in the system, which provides valuable
information by itself, and can be used to identify potential
multiple contingencies that can cause dramatic blackouts.
Identification of multiple contingencies has recently started
to draw a lot of interest. Salmeron, Wood, and Baldick [2]
employed a bilevel optimization framework along with mixed-
integer programming to analyze the security of the grid under
terrorist threat. The critical elements of the grid were identified
by maximizing the long term disruption in the system, caused
by an attack with limited resources. Arroyo and Galiana used
a similar bilevel optimization approach. Donde et al. [3],
proposed a method that connected the feasibility boundary
of power flow equations with spectral graph theory, when
voltages are fixed at their nominal values, and only active
power flow constraints are considered. Later, Donde et al.
[4] extended their approach to include reactive power and
proposed a mixed integer nonlinear programming formulation
to identify the most significant blackout that can be caused
by a specified number of lines or to identify the minimum of
lines to cause a blackout of specified severance. More recently,
Lesieutre et al. [5] approached this problem from a graph
theoretical perspective, by looking for subgraphs in a given
graph that are loosely connected to the rest of the graph and
have a significant load/generation mismatch.
Identifying a vulnerability in the a power system is im-
portant, however, system robustness requires identifying all
vulnerabilities of the system. For instance, a specific broken
line can take the system dangerously close to infeasibility,
so that any one of a handful of broken lines can cause a
significant blackout. In this case the real valuable information
is not a pair of lines, but the first line, which is most critical,
and the second group of lines any one of which can cause
a blackout. Therefore, we need tools that can provide global
information on the system, as opposed pointing to specific
events, and which can be used to detect not only one but
many, and preferably all blackouts. In this work, we define a
metric for criticality of each line in a power system, and show
how to compute this metric. Such information on criticality of
power lines can guide system operators to watch closely those
lines that might cause significant disturbance to the system
if broken. Moreover, this measure of criticality allows us to
selectively investigate different scenarios for multiple contin-
gencies. We would like to stress that this process is different
than brute-force enumeration, since we will be investigating a
scenario only if we know it is perilous. Therefore, the cases
to be examined in detail depends directly on the robustness of
the system.
To compute the criticality of a line, we solve the dual
problem, in which we compute the expendability of a line.
That is, a line is critical if it is not expendable. For this
purpose, we introduce line parameters for each line that can
limit its functionality, so that a high parameter value means,
we are using its functionality close to maximum, and a low
parameter value means the line is not really being utilized.
To measure the criticality of these lines, we minimize the
functionality parameters of all lines constrained by power
flow equations. At an optimal solution to this problem, the
line parameters represent the core of the system, which is
absolutely necessary for the system to stay feasible. At this
optimal solution, if a line parameter is high, that means we
really need this line for the system to stay intact. Conversely,
if a line parameter is low, that means the system can probably
survive without it. Our experiments on the IEEE 30 and IEEE
118 bus systems show the effectiveness of our method.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A. Computing the criticality of a line
We consider a lossless power system network having m
buses (nodes) and n lines (branches). Let P and Q be,
respectively, vectors whose components are given by the active
and reactive power injections at the buses. Due to the lossless
character of the system, we have
∑m
i=1 Pi = 0, however,∑m
i=1Qi > 0 as part of the reactive power is consumed in
the network.
We note that reducing the admittance of any transmission
line in the system to zero is equivalent to removing the line
from service. We thus model line expendability in the system
by associating a set of variables 0 ≤ γi ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
with the line admittances and define the modified admittance
of line i as the product of the admittance of line i with γi.
Then γi = 0 corresponds to the i-th line being removed from
service, and thus completely expendable, while γi = 1, which
results in the modified admittance being equal to the nominal
admittance, indicates that the line is in service at full capacity.
Representing the network angle variables and voltage mag-
nitudes by vectors θ and V , respectively, and letting B denote
a diagonal matrix with the value of the line susceptances on its
diagonal1, the active and reactive power flow equations (with
modified admittances) can be written in matrix form as
ATEBΓ sin(Aθ)− P = 0 (1)
−|A|TEBΓ cos(Aθ) + d−Q = 0, (2)
where A is the branch-node incidence matrix of the network
graph and |A|i,j = |Ai,j |, E is a diagonal matrix with
Ei,i = exp((|A| lnV )i), i = 1, . . . , n,
Γ is a diagonal matrix with
Γi,i = γi, i = 1, . . . , n,
d is defined by
di = V 2i × (ATBΓA)i,i, i = 1, . . . ,m,
and sin(Aθ) denotes a vector whose i-th component is equal
to sin((Aθ)i). Similar notation is used to define cos(Aθ) and
lnV . Refer to [6] for more details on this model.
To measure the criticality of all lines, we try to reduce
all line parameters as much as possible, constrained by the
feasibility of the power flow equations. In the end, what
remains is the core of the system, that is the minimal in the
system that is necessary to satisfy the power flow equations.
In an optimal solution, if a line parameter γi is close to
zero, then this line is not likely to be critical, since we can
find a solution to the system while this lines functionality is
extremely limited. On the other hand, if a line parameter is
1It is assumed for simplicity that the lines are lossless and shunt elements
are absent. However the mathematical framework and the formulations pro-
posed later do not require this assumption.
Fig. 1. The branching algorithm
close to 1, then this line must be critical, since we fail to limit
the functionality of this line while keeping the power flow
equations feasible.
Mathematically, this problem can be represented as follows.
min
γ,θ,V
‖γ‖ (3)
F (θ, V, γ) = 0 (4)
Vmin ≤ V ≤ Vmax (5)
− pi/2 ≤ Aθ ≤ pi/2 (6)
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 (7)
where, F (θ, V, γ) corresponds to the power flow equations in
(1) and (2). Voltages are bounded with (5). The constraint on
angular differences in (6) is required for steady state stability,
and the last constraint limits the range of line parameters.
An important point in this formulation is the choice of
the norm in the objective function. Since we are trying to
identify the most critical lines, we need to favor norms that
will minimize the maximum, which excludes the 1-norm. On
the other hand, we are trying to find criticality/expendability of
all lines at the same time, thus we need a norm that can push
each individual line to its minimum, which excludes the ∞-
norm. In our experiments, we have observed that the 3-norm
and the 4-norm has performed best in terms of separating the
most critical lines from the others.
B. Identifying Multiple Contingencies
A solution to the optimization problem in (3)–(7) provides
an overall view of the system, and highlights the most critical
lines in the system. This information might be used to guide
system operators to closely follow certain parts of the system,
redispatch the loads to decrease dependence on a certain lines,
or develop plans for how to respond to a line failure promptly.
This information can also be utilized to identify multiple
contingencies, by selectively searching various combinations
of failed lines. As discussed before, a complete enumeration
or random selections are either prohibitively expensive, or not
effective, and the power systems of interest are now too big
and complex to rely on engineering intuitions. Therefore, a
selective search process is essential.
Given a solution to the problem in (3)–(7), one can branch
on lines by investigating the system when a specified line is
already out. This process is illustrated in Fig. 1. In this figure,
the left branch corresponds to choosing a line, assuming it is
already broken (γi = 0), and investigating the system under
this assumption. The right branch corresponds to investigating
all scenarios, for which the chosen line is active (γi = 1).
Observe that two branches set the line parameter at 0 and
1, thus explore mutually exclusive combinations. We repeat
the process at each branch, to investigate the consequences
of different combinations of broken lines. It is worth noting
that at each branch, we don’t need to stay with the original
operating point, but can modify it to reflect how the load
might be redispatched after a broken line. In our experiments
however, we did not change the initial operating point.
The essence of this technique is how to choose the line to
branch on. If we can choose the critical lines, then we can
restrict our search process to groups of lines that can poten-
tially have a significant impact when they are concurrently
out of service. We use the technique described in the previous
section to prioritize the lines to branch on. We first solve the
problem in (3)–(7), and choose the line with the highest γi
value to branch on. Then at each node we solve the reduced
problem, where the value of γi is set to 0 or 1. This allows
us to examine different combinations of broken lines that are
likely to cause a significant blackout, without going through
an exhaustive search procedure.
A nice feature of the branching algorithm is that it is self-
correcting, since even if a critical line gets a low criticality
value at the first evaluation, this line will still be detected as we
explore different combinations and as the critical line missed
at the beginning becomes more and more critical.
In our implementation, we maintained a priority queue
to examine the most “interesting” cases before others. We
are interested in most severe blackouts that are caused by
minimum number of lines, and the priority of a scenario
in the queue is determined by approximations to these two
objectives. Specifically, we assign a priority based on the
number of lines already cut, and the γi for the line to branch
on.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have applied our proposed techniques to analyze IEEE
30 and IEEE 118 systems [8]. We have used a slightly
modified version of the IEEE 30 bus system as in [4], where
the generator active power injections are modified so that
there is no natural power balance in the system, providing
a better test case for vulnerability analysis. This modified data
set is presented in detail in [4]. The solutions were computed
using the solver SNOPT [7], which uses a sequential quadratic
programming algorithm and is designed for nonlinear opti-
mization problems with sparse linear and nonlinear constraints
and derivatives.
The first part of our experiments focuses on how we
compute the criticality of lines, and the second part focuses
Fig. 2. The histogram of line criticalities
on how we exploit this information to detect multiple con-
tingencies. We evaluate the performance of our method for
computing criticality by 4 metrics: consistency (criticalities
of lines should be invariant), separation (some lines should
be separated from the others as the more critical lines),
efficiency (fast solutions are essential for multiple contingency
analysis), and accuracy (our measurements should match the
real criticalities of lines).
To observe the consistency of our measurements, we solved
problem (3)–(7) for the IEEE 118 bus system, starting from
10 different initial solutions using SNOPT, and looked that the
deviation from the average. The deviations were consistently
105 times less than the computed value, which shows the
consistency of the computed results. While the consistency
depends on the solver being used, SNOPT is sensitive to the
initial starting point, just like other nonlinear solvers, and the
consistency of our results show that the posed optimization
problem is well-behaved enough to be solved consistently with
a state of the art solver.
Our experiments with the IEEE 30 and IEEE 118 bus
systems also showed that our technique can identify a small
group of lines as the most critical lines. Fig. 2 illustrates the
histogram of line criticalities for the IEEE 118 bus system. The
lines are put into one of 10 bins accordingly their γ values. In
the figure, the x-axis show the bins, and the y-axis corresponds
to the number of lines in each bin. As seen in this figure, the
criticalities follow a bell curve as desired. Only 6 lines have
criticality values > 0.9, which provides a nice separation for
the lines that should be investigated first. It is worth noting
that this behavior very much depends on the norm being used
to measure ‖γ‖. The histogram in the figure was generated
with the 4-norm. As discussed in Section II-A, the 1 and ∞-
norms cannot provide these patterns. In our experiments, the
2-norm was not very effective either, but we got similar results
with the 3 and 5 norms. For different data sets, it might be
beneficial to try different, possibly higher norms, if a good
separation for γ values is not achieved.
We ran our experiments on an Opteron processor with 2.2
GHz clock speed, and 3GB memory per processor. Run-times
of our experiments on the IEEE-118 bus system were only
5-6 seconds on average. This makes the proposed branching
algorithm for multiple contingency analysis feasible. We want
to stress that even with these fast run-times, complete enu-
meration is not feasible. The complete enumeration for the
IEEE-118 system will take around 1 day for N − 2 security,
and 65 days for N − 3.
Our experiments with the modified 30 bus system has shown
the accuracy of our method. At a solution to (3)–(7) the
lines with highest γ values were lines 16 and 10, which are
marked in Figure 3. The criticality of line 16 is obvious, since
its removal takes out a generator. However, line 10 is not
expected, and its removal causes a significant blackout in the
system. Recall that we are working with a modified version
of the IEEE-30 bus system, where the generation has been
redistributed. We have measured the significance of a blackout
as the norm the residual vector when we try to minimize the
error for power flow equations. When line 10 was removed the
norm of the error was more than 21% of the norm of the active
and reactive power injections, i.e., ‖(PT , QT )T ‖. When we
removed lines with low γ values, the system was still feasible,
or the norm of the error was very small. These results show
that our proposed method accurately detects critical lines.
In the next set of experiments, we used the criticality
information to find multiple contingencies. The next five lines
with highest criticality values were 36, 5, 8, 12, and 3. After
removing line 36, and running the optimization algorithm
again, we identified, lines 3, 5, 6, and 30 as critical lines,
and observed that severe blackouts happen when any one of
these lines is removed along with line 36. Similarly, lines
36 or 9 along with line 5; lines 7, 9, 27, 28, or 38 along
with line 8; lines 30 or 38 along with line 12; lines 28 or 36
along with line 3, cause severe blackouts. We are currently
working on the contingency analysis of the IEEE 118 system.
Our experiments showed that while the correlation between
criticality values and severity of resulting blackouts is not strict
(i.e., a bigger criticality value does not guarantee a more severe
blackout), the criticality values provide a nice prioritization for
the criticality of lines, and identify the most critical ones.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We propose a nonlinear optimization method to identify
critical lines, failure of which can cause severe blackouts. Our
method computes a criticality measures for all lines at a time,
providing a global view of the system. This information can be
used to identify multiple contingencies by selectively explor-
ing multiple combinations of broken lines. The effectiveness of
our method is demonstrated on IEEE 30 and 118 bus systems,
where we can very quickly detect the most critical lines in the
system and identify multiple contingencies.
Fig. 3. IEEE 30 bus system
This paper reports our initial results on how to measure
criticality of lines in a power system and how to exploit this
information, and we plan to extend our work for comprehen-
sive results. We will change blackout severity measurements
to incorporate a load shedding model and try several different
nonlinear solvers before applying our techniques to continental
size problems. While the proposed optimization problem can
be solved on a single processor, the number of cases examined
can be easily increased by employing multiple processors. We
are planning to exploit the inherently parallel nature of the
branching algorithm, to use state of the art high performance
computing platforms. Our formulations along with the use
of high performance computing will allow us to enhance the
robustness of the power system.
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